RECKORD FINAL.DOC

10/12/2005 5:53:21 PM

LIMITING THE EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN NEW JERSEY: A WAY TO PROTECT AND
PRESERVE THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
Stephanie Reckord ∗
Oceanfront property presents unique conflicts between public
and private notions of property law. The public trust doctrine is a
common law doctrine that seeks to balance the rights of both the
1
private owner and the public. The doctrine seeks to protect the
public, which has historical rights in the wet sand area, and the
private landowner who claims an exclusive ownership interest in the
2
dry sand area. Even so, conflicts often arise between the upland
owner and the public, forcing courts to adjudicate these disputes.
On one hand, a private owner has exclusive rights to the particular
parcel in question. On the other hand, the parcel in question is
located in a geographic location that has substantial value to the
public at large. This type of adjudication involves a delicate balance
3
between private property ideals and the rights of the public at large.
Because of New Jersey’s unique geography, beach conflict cases often
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1
Michael A. Walker, Note, CERCLA’s Natural Resource Damage Provisions: A
Loophole for Private Landowners?, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 425, 444 (1995). For a discussion
of the origins of the public trust doctrine, see discussion infra Part I.
2
Walker, supra note 1, at 444. The wet sand area is the land between the mean
high and low tide lines, while the dry sand area consists of the property landward of
the mean high tide line. Id.
3
See James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the Environment after Palazzolo,
30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2002).
The battle over property rights in America has rekindled an age-old
debate: whether our legal system is based upon the assumption that
man uses and has dominion over property for his own benefit, limited
only by the proviso that no harm is done to the public, or whether
property can be put to private beneficial use only with the consent of
the sovereign, and that “private” property is held subject to an inchoate
trust for larger societal interests.
Id. at 2.
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arise and a substantial amount of case law in the field has developed,
5
making New Jersey a pioneer in this area.
Beachfront property law in New Jersey can be broken down into
three contexts. The first context involves the application of the
public trust doctrine to beaches that are municipally-owned and
6
maintained. Traditional problems in this area often involve beach
7
fees and the permissibility of resident or member classifications.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has not permitted such
classifications, and the court has held that the doctrine demands that
the upland dry sand beaches of municipalities be open equally to all
8
for a wide variety of recreational purposes. The second context
9
involves “quasi-municipal” beaches, which refers to beaches that
hold themselves out as providers of recreational services, such as
10
In the landmark case,
private beach clubs and associations.
11
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, the court subjected such
quasi-public beaches to the same rules as municipal beaches, thus
4

Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1978). In Van Ness, the
court stated:
The Public Trust Doctrine has always been recognized in New Jersey.
It is deeply engrained in our common law, due, no doubt, to New
Jersey’s unique location on the Atlantic Ocean, Delaware and New York
Bays with numerous rivers and tributaries emptying into these bodies,
resulting in extensive shorelines and considerable tidal waters and tidal
lands in the State.
Id. (citation omitted).
5
Sean T. Morris, Note, Taking Stock in the Public Trust Doctrine: Can States Provide
for Beach Access Without Running Afoul of the Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence?, 52 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1015, 1020–21 (2003); Gilbert L. Finnel, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public
Property Judicial Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 641 (1989) (“New
Jersey’s Supreme Court is a leader in applying the public trust doctrine to protect the
public’s rights to use dry sand beaches.”).
6
For examples of how New Jersey views the role of municipal beaches and the
rule that municipal beaches must be held open to all equally regardless of resident
or member status, see Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 574, and Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972).
7
See Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573–74; Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 48–49.
8
See Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 574; Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 55.
9
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 368 (N.J. 1984).
In Matthews, the court deemed the defendant, Bay Head Improvement Association,
to be “quasi-municipal” because its “activities paralleled those of a municipality in the
operation of the beachfront.” Id.
10
Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the totality of the
circumstances to determine that the particular beach in question was “quasimunicipal.” Id. The court explained: “[w]hen viewed in its totality—[the
Association’s] purposes, relationship with the municipality, communal characteristic,
activities, and virtual monopoly over the Bay Head beachfront—the quasi-public
nature of the Association is apparent.” Id.
11
471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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holding that access cannot be restricted. Further, the court held
that such beaches must allow public use of the upland dry sand areas
13
as well as the traditional wet sand area. The third context is that of
14
the private beachfront homeowner.
The holding in Matthews,
although limited to the quasi-public nature of the beach in the
controversy, did determine that “private land is not immune from a
possible right of access to the foreshore for swimming or bathing
purposes, nor is it immune from the possibility that some of the dry
sand may be used by the public incidental to the right of bathing and
15
swimming.”
New Jersey has tackled these inherent conflicts between owners
and the public within the framework of the three contexts laid out
16
above.
New Jersey courts have granted substantial rights to the
public at the expense of the private owner in both the first and
17
second contexts. Although there is no precedent with respect to
the third context, the natural progression seems to be towards
18
granting the public more rights in private beaches. Yet, it is unclear
how the courts will decide cases involving homeowners’ associations
on the beachfront or an individual homeowner’s exclusive possession
19
of the beach adjacent to its home.
On July 26, 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the
most recent case in the line of beach controversies, Raleigh Avenue
20
Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. The central issue in Raleigh
concerned conflicts between the owner of a private beach club and
21
The New Jersey Supreme
the public over beach access and use.
Court, following Matthews, held that access could not be restricted to

12

See id. at 368.
Id. at 364, 368.
14
With respect to this third context, Matthews is still the leading case on point in
that it demonstrates the court’s willingness to extend the public rights under the
public trust doctrine to private upland dry sand beaches. See id. at 369–70.
15
Id. at 369.
16
See generally Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363; Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d
571, 573 (N.J. 1978); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294
A.2d 47, 48–49 (N.J. 1972).
17
See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364, 368; Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 574; Neptune City, 294
A.2d at 55.
18
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 369–70.
19
In Matthews, the court refrained from deciding this issue. It did expressly limit
its holding to the quasi-municipal nature of the beach, but conceded that
“considerable uncertainty will continue to surround the question of the public’s right
to cross private land and to use a portion of the dry sand . . . .” Id. at 370.
20
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
21
Id. at 113.
13
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22

members of the beach club only. The court mandated that Atlantis
Beach Club (“Atlantis”), a private owner, must permit the public to
vertically access the wet sand and allow the public to enjoy the entire
23
upland dry sand area. Furthermore, the court found that Atlantis
24
may only charge a reasonable fee for access and use. The court’s
willingness to follow and expand the holding in Matthews
demonstrates the court’s disregard for the rights and privileges of
private ownership.
Since the New Jersey Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Matthews, the rights of private owners of beachfront property are in a
25
state of concern, if not jeopardy. New Jersey has often expanded
26
the doctrine to fit the changing needs of the public.
Although
courts have the ability to make changes to a particular field of law, in
the case of the public trust doctrine, such changes can be unfair and
arbitrary because they affect the rights of landowners who are
27
constitutionally protected from uncompensated seizure of property.
Were the legislature or the executive, rather than a court, to mandate
a private owner to open private property to the general public,
commentator Barton Thompson has suggested that “the United
States Supreme Court would almost certainly hold that the state had
28
taken the owners’ property in violation of the Constitution.”
22

Id. (holding that “the public trust doctrine requires the Atlantis property to be
open to the general public at a reasonable fee for services provided by the owner and
approved by the Department of Environmental Protection”).
23
See id. at 124.
24
Id. at 125 (affirming the Appellate Division’s determination that the
Department of Environmental Protection’s authority “includes jurisdiction to review
fees proposed by Atlantis for use of its beach” and that such fees shall be limited to
“an amount ‘required to operate and maintain the facility’ as a guide, and that fees
will not be approved if they operate to ‘limit access by placing an unreasonable
economic burden on the public’” (quoting Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis
Beach Club, 851 A.2d 19, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d, 879 A.2d 112
(N.J. 2005))).
25
See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1451–52
(1990) (discussing the recent trend of restricting private property rights in order to
expand those of the public and/or the government).
26
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984);
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).
27
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“Nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.”). See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t of
Envtl. Protection, 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 356 (D.N.J. 1999) (plaintiffs alleging a
regulatory taking where a building regulation required owners to build and maintain
a walkway along the waterfront).
28
Thompson, supra note 25, at 1450. National Ass’n of Home Builders, although
applying the public trust doctrine to an allegation of a taking, is not relevant because
it involves a claim of a regulatory taking. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 64 F. Supp.
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This Comment argues that courts should avoid expanding the
doctrine to accomplish what legislative and administrative bodies
would be constitutionally prohibited from doing. This Comment
proposes that courts not use the doctrine to bypass the requirements
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which requires
29
compensation after a taking of private property by the government.
30
Because of the nation’s strong commitment to private ownership,
the public trust doctrine should not be used as a tool to grant further
31
rights to the public at the expense of the private landowner. A slow
and steady expansion of this doctrine not only violates constitutional
rights, but also leads to the eradication of private oceanfront property
and leaves landowners uncompensated, disenfranchised, and without
32
notice of the actual geographic scope of their property.
Courts
should not permit “the state [to] evade the due process and takings
limits on the police power by extending the reach of the public trust
33
doctrine.”
This Comment will argue for appropriate limitations on the
public trust doctrine. It will begin by presenting the historical and
general background of its development. Part I provides a policy
discussion of the doctrine’s original underlying purposes and goals.
Further, Part I advocates limiting the expansion of the doctrine to
those objectives. Part II provides a chronological view of New Jersey’s
expansion of the doctrine as a way of enlarging the public’s rights to
the foreshore and dry sand area. Part III discusses the inherent
conflicts involved in owning beachfront property. Specifically, it
addresses the conflicts between fundamental notions of private
property and the rights of the public concerning access to and use of
2d at 356. This Comment is concerned with state court interpretations of the public
trust doctrine, not its application to the analysis of a regulatory taking.
29
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30
See Burling, supra note 3, at 1–4. Burling states: “Indeed our Constitution was
but the latest manifestation of the long-standing natural law understanding that an
individual’s property should not be taken without compensation.” Id. at 4.
31
James L. Huffman, Symposium on the Public Trust and the Waters of the American
West: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Introduction and Overview: A Fish out of Water: The
Public Trust Doctrine in Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 559 (1989) (“By
expanding the scope of public trust rights, the state will expand its ability to regulate
beyond the constraints of the Constitution. The state can thus evade the due process
and takings limits on the police power by extending the reach of the public trust
doctrine.”).
32
Id. Professor Huffman describes such taking of rights from one group and
granting them to another as too “easy and unprincipled.” Id. at 567.
33
Id. at 559. The Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment are applicable to the States by means of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

RECKORD FINAL.DOC

254

10/12/2005 5:53:21 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:249

the wet and dry sand areas. Part IV discusses the United States
Supreme Court’s analysis of the takings doctrine and links the
constitutional protections of the Fifth Amendment to the recent
judicial expansions of the public trust doctrine. To do so, a synopsis
of the takings doctrine, eminent domain, and property jurisprudence
will be necessary.
Last, Part V advocates a limited public trust doctrine specifically
34
This Comment proposes that courts
designed for New Jersey.
should not expand the doctrine as an end run around the takings
doctrine. Private property requires courts to maintain clear and
distinct boundary lines and to respect the fundamental rights of
35
landowners as well as those of the public.
I.

BACKGROUND

The public trust doctrine is a common law creature with ancient
36
roots. Historically, the doctrine protected the land where the tide
37
ebbed and flowed. The doctrine provides that the land adjacent to
38
In
the water’s edge is held in trust for the people by the state.
theory, then, regarding oceanfront property, the land subject to the
39
“ebb and flow” of the tide is beneficially owned by the people. The
40
land subject to the doctrine is often referred to as the “wet sand.”
The public’s right as trust beneficiary is “subject to reasonable
limitations, to use public trust lands and associated navigable (or
public trust) waters for a wide variety of commercial and recreational
41
purposes.”

34

Morris, supra note 5, at 1020–21 (“New Jersey courts have been both pioneers
and leaders in their application of the Public Trust Doctrine, being among the first
to both discuss the concept and to expand its usage.”).
35
Burling, supra note 3, at 1–4; Huffman, supra note 31, at 567. According to
Professor Huffman, “[b]y confusing the property rights character of the public trust
doctrine with concepts of trust law, constitutional rights, judicial review, and
governmental power, the courts and commentators have opened the door to
dramatic expansion of governmental power with resultant intrusions upon individual
rights.” Id.
36
Walker, supra note 1, at 444.
37
Id. The ebb and flow of the tide is often referred to as navigable waters. Id.
Courts have interpreted the area to be the sand between the high and low tide lines.
See, e.g., Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26 (1929).
38
DONNA R. CHRISTIE & RICHARD G. HILDRETH, COASTAL AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT
LAW 8 (2d ed. 1999).
39
JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 2 (2d ed. 2002).
40
Id. Title to the land below the mean high-tide line that comprises the wet sand
is held by the state. Id.
41
Id.
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The doctrine has its roots in Roman law, which considered
42
certain objects to be subject to common ownership. Specifically, the
43
air, water, and sea were viewed as common property. According to
Roman law, “[t]he use of these resources was available to all, so long
as the conduct of one individual did not infringe upon the use of
44
The English followed this principle but
resources by others.”
45
changed the idea of common ownership to that of state ownership.
Under English common law, the king as the sovereign
controlled the lands “subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, often
46
referred to as land under navigable waters,” in trust for the public.
Therefore, “the Crown could not appropriate the resources for its
47
own use or convey them to others.” Technically, title, referred to as
jus privatum, was in the king as sovereign, but dominion over the
lands, referred to as jus publicum, was vested in the Crown as a trust
48
Under this scheme, the public
for the benefit of the public.
49
acquired two principal rights: fishing and navigation.
Today, land above the mean high tide line to the line of
50
vegetation, called the “dry sand,” is subject to private ownership.
The land below the mean high tide line, called the “wet sand,”
51
however, is held in trust by the state for the public. For this reason,
the lands that comprise the wet sand are often called the “public trust
52
lands” or the “sovereignty lands.” As beneficiary of this trust, the
public has rights subject to “reasonable limitations” to use the public
53
trust lands for a number of purposes that vary from state to state.
42

Walker, supra note 1, at 444.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 8.
47
Walker, supra note 1, at 444.
48
CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 19; Charles F. Wilkinson, Symposium on
the Public Trust and the Waters of the American West: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow:
Introduction and Overview: The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source
and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 430–31 (1989).
49
Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts
Colonial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 623, 628 (1998) (“Of these two public uses,
navigation has historically been considered the superior right.”).
50
KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 1. This is the general rule, but there are some
states that use the low tide line as the mark of private ownership. Mark Cheung,
Dockominiums: An Expansion of Riparian Rights That Violates the Public Trust Doctrine, 16
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 821, 835 (1989). Those states that use the low tide line still
subject the land between the low and high tide lines to the trust doctrine. Id.
51
KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2.
52
Id.
53
Id.
43
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Lateral or horizontal access is considered a public right under
54
the public trust doctrine, following from the traditional purpose of
the doctrine. The doctrine was designed so that the public could, for
55
fishing and navigational purposes, make use of the wet sand area.
Therefore, the public right to horizontal access cannot be restricted
56
as long as the horizontal access is in the wet sand area. However,
there are some traditional ways in which the public can gain vertical
57
or perpendicular access through private property. The public may
58
59
achieve such access through prescription, implied dedication, or
60
customary use.
In addition, private ownership interests may also exist in the
61
public trust lands. These interests consist of common law rights and
privileges to use the waters and wet sand areas and are classified as
62
either littoral or riparian rights. Littoral rights are those rights of

54

CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 42.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 91. In order to succeed through prescription,
the public’s use must be open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, and
adverse for the prescribed amount of time by statute. Id. Achieving access through
prescription is often difficult because it is near impossible for such a large group as
the public to meet all of the elements of prescription. CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra
note 38, at 43. Christie and Hildreth state: “Establishing adverse use can be the
greatest obstacle to overcome in acquiring a public prescriptive easement [because]
[p]ermissive use can never ripen into an easement.” Id. at 44.
59
KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 92. In order to gain access through implied
dedication, the public must show through acts and circumstances “that the
landowner intended to donate an easement to the public and that such an offer was
impliedly accepted.” CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 45. Difficulty arises if
implied dedication is used to secure access and use of private dry sand because the
owner of the particular parcel must have stopped using the property for the requisite
time period; concurrent use will not satisfy dedication and would thus be considered
a revocable license. Luise Welby, Comment, Public Access to Private Beaches: A Private
Necessity, 6 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 69, 80–81 (1986).
60
See KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 93. Commentaries have “defined the
requirements of custom to be public use that is ancient, exercised without
interruption, reasonably, obligatory, and not repugnant to other custom law.”
CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 47. Customary rights “evolved from the belief
that a usage that lasted for centuries must have been founded on a legal right
conferred in the distant past, and, therefore, should be recognized and enforced
even though never formally recorded.” Welby, supra note 59, at 82. The difficulty
with using custom law to gain access and use of private lands is that the geographic
area claimed must be specific and reasonable. Id. at 84. Thus, gaining a significant
portion of beach for the public would require vast and costly litigation on a parcel-byparcel basis. Id.
61
KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2.
62
Id.
55

RECKORD FINAL.DOC

2005]

10/12/2005 5:53:21 PM

COMMENT

257
63

owners associated with saltwater bodies and freshwater lakes.
Riparian rights refer to the rights of owners in rivers and other
64
65
freshwater bodies. The state maintains title to coastal waters.
Upon the colonization of America, title to American tidal waters
66
passed from the king to the respective colonies. After the American
67
Revolution, title over lands under tidal waters vested in the states.
Before the acquisition of new territories, the tidal lands were held in
trust by the United States government until the time of new state
68
creation. At the time of state creation, title to tidal lands within the
69
new state’s boundaries was passed to the newly created state.
The United States officially adopted the public trust doctrine as
part of the common law, but granted title to the states allowing each
70
to administer its own version of the trust. In Illinois Central Railroad
71
Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court acknowledged the public’s rights
inherent in the trust doctrine when it upheld the revocation of a land
grant by a state noting that a state “can no more abdicate its trust over
property in which the whole people are interested . . . than it can
72
abdicate its police powers . . . .” Therefore, by the late Nineteenth
Century, the United States recognized the duty of the states to
73
protect the lands subject to the trust. The Court also emphasized
that all navigable waterways are subject to the public trust doctrine
74
Therefore, although the states have title and
under federal law.
63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Walker, supra note 1, at 445.
67
CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 9.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 19.
71
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
72
Id. at 453. The Court’s acceptance of the doctrine under federal law solidified
the position that the lands subject to the public trust doctrine could not be
transferred free of the public’s claim. The Court explained that “[t]he trust with
which they are held, therefore, is governmental and cannot be alienated, except in
those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus
held, or when parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the public interest in
the lands and waters remaining.” Id. at 455–56.
73
See id.
74
Id. at 453–54.
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion
and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of
the several States, belong to the respective States within which they are
found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion
thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of the
interest of the public in the waters, and subject always to the
64
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power, the public trust doctrine is created under federal law, making
75
it mandatory for the states to maintain some version of the doctrine.
This is significant in light of the recent expansions of the doctrine,
because once the geographic area covered by the trust is increased, it
is permanently subject to the trust.
76
In Shively v. Bowlby, the Supreme Court explained that tidal
lands are distinguishable from those landward of the high tide line
because of their equal importance to all for purposes of commerce,
77
navigation and fishery. The Court stated: “Their improvement by
individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the
public use and right. Therefore, the title and the control of tidal
lands are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole
78
In other words, the rights of private individuals are
people.”
subordinated to the rights of the public to enjoy the area for
commerce, navigation, and fishing. Furthermore, while the states
have discretion in determining proper uses of the trust lands, Shively
reiterated that states are limited to that which “can be done without
substantial impairment of the interest of the public in such waters,
and subject to the paramount right of Congress to control their
navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of
79
commerce.”
II. NEW JERSEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Proponents of increasing beach access and expanding the
geographic area of the public trust lands often urge state courts to
80
utilize the public trust doctrine to meet their goals. Because of the
failings of other attempts to secure increased public access and rights,
public advocates are now recommending the use of the public trust

paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as may
be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and
among the States.
Id. at 435.
75
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435. The Supreme Court “left it to the individual
states to determine the development and implementation of the Public Trust
Doctrine.” Morris, supra note 5, at 1019. In other words, “the states are federally
prohibited from abrogating the public trust entirely.” Wilkinson, supra note 48, at
464.
76
152 U.S. 1 (1894).
77
See id. at 17.
78
Id. at 57.
79
Id. at 47.
80
Thompson, supra note 25, at 1535–37; Morris, supra note 5, at 1039–40.
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doctrine, and they often cite Matthews as the leading case on point.
Matthews, however, was not the first New Jersey case to entertain the
82
doctrine’s expansion. New Jersey’s expansion has been an ongoing
83
and cumulative process.
A. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea
84

Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea presented
the issue of whether a municipality could charge non-residents a
85
higher fee than residents to access its beaches.
The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a municipality may not restrict access based
86
on individuals’ residency.
To reach this conclusion, the court
utilized the public trust doctrine to expand the rights associated with
public trust lands beyond the traditional rights of fishing and
87
navigation. Although the court conceded that the “original purpose
of the doctrine was to preserve for the use of all the public natural
88
water resources for navigation and commerce,” it considered the
89
doctrine to be flexible and not limited to its original purposes.
In holding that a municipality may not discriminate on the basis
of residency, the court used the doctrine to mandate that access must
90
be provided for all equally. The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that:
at least where the upland sand area is owned by a municipality—a
political subdivision and creature of the state—and dedicated to
public beach purposes, a modern court must take the view that
the public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean

81

James M. Kehoe, The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees
of Public Trust Properties, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1935–37 (1995); Morris, supra note
5, at 1039–40.
While the theories of eminent domain, custom and implied dedication
are all of some assistance in acquiring public easements across and
upon private shore property, none of them will be effective as a longterm solution. Only the public trust doctrine has the potential to
provide a long-range solution to the public access problem.
Welby, supra note 59, at 102.
82
See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B.
83
Morris, supra note 5, at 1021–22.
84
294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
85
Id. at 48.
86
Id. at 55.
87
Id. at 51, 54.
88
Id. at 52.
89
Id. at 54.
90
Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 55.
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waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference
91
and that any contrary state or municipal action is impermissible.

To reach its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the
92
public trust doctrine broadly.
It explained that “public rights in
tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation
and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses, including
93
bathing, swimming and other shore activities.” Never before had
New Jersey provided for such wide latitude. The New Jersey Supreme
Court changed the public trust doctrine so that it could “be molded
and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it
94
was created to benefit.” Thus, the Neptune City court’s expansion of
the doctrine was two-fold: it increased the public’s inherent rights to
include recreation and it enhanced the public’s right of access to
include the upland dry sand of municipal beaches.
In his dissent, Justice Francis predicted the continued expansion
95
of the doctrine. The justice explained that the public has
considerable rights in the land seaward of the mean high tide line,
but questioned the majority’s expansion of the public’s rights in trust
96
lands and in municipal upland dry sand beaches. Further, Justice
Francis argued that the majority’s holding necessarily meant that the
public would be able to make use of all private dry sand areas, not
97
just those on municipal beaches. Justice Francis posed the corollary
question: “[O]f what utility [are the recreational rights] if access from
98
the upland does not exist or is refused by the upland owner?”
Disagreeing with the expansion of rights and the determination that
all municipal dry sand beaches must be open to all equally, Justice
Francis espoused the opinion that the public does not have rights on
99
privately-owned dry sand beaches.
B. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal
100

Van Ness v. Borough of Deal reinforced the decision in Neptune
City, as Van Ness only concerned the application of the public trust
91

Id. at 54.
See id. at 51.
93
Id. at 54.
94
Id.
95
Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 56 (Francis, J., dissenting).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 56–57. According to Justice Francis, “a private owner could legally fence
in his entire beach area upland of the mean high water mark . . . .” Id. at 57.
100
393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978).
92
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doctrine to municipal dry sand beaches.
The particular conflict
involved whether a municipally-owned beach, Deal Casino, could
limit a part of the beach for Deal residents who were members of the
102
The casino did not restrict the public’s access to the
casino.
103
waterfront or its use of the beach adjacent to the high water mark.
However, a portion of the upland dry sand beach was reserved for
104
members of the casino and their guests.
The Public Advocate
argued that the dry sand of the casino must be open to the public in
105
Deal, on the other hand, argued that, because the
its entirety.
public could enjoy the rights associated with the wet sand area and
because the particular beach was never dedicated to the public, it
could continue to limit access to an area of the dry sand to its
106
107
members. The trial court agreed with the Public Advocate, while
108
the Appellate Division sided with the municipality.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, relying on its holding
109
in Neptune City.
Again, the court announced that municipallyowned dry sand beaches must be open to all members of the public
110
equally. Significantly, Van Ness “abandoned the limitation found in
[Neptune City] that the upland must be dedicated to public beach
111
Instead, the New
purposes in order for the doctrine to apply.”
Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that because the casino dedicated the
beach for recreational purposes in general, the rule of Neptune City

101

Id. at 573.
Id. at 572.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 572–73.
106
Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 572.
107
Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 352 A.2d 599, 608–09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975), rev’d, 367 A.2d 1191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), rev’d, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J.
1978). The Chancery Division held: “Deal is discriminating illegally against
nonresidents . . . .” Id. at 609. Interestingly, the court did not base its decision on
the public trust doctrine, but on municipal power and equal protection theories. See
id.
108
Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 367 A.2d 1191, 1197–98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976), rev’g, 352 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), rev’d, 393 A.2d 571
(N.J. 1978). The Appellate Division held that Deal Casino had satisfied the
requirements of the public trust doctrine because it had set aside “a reasonable
portion of the beach” for public use. Id.
109
Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573–74.
110
Id.
111
Geoffrey R. Scott, The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine: A Warning to
Environmentalists and Policy Makers, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J. 1, 42 (1998).
102
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112

applied.
The case also made clear that the entire beach, both the
wet and dry sand areas, had to be available to all citizens regardless of
113
The New Jersey Supreme
their status as residents or members.
Court, however, did expressly limit its holding by noting that “[w]e
are not called upon to deal with beaches on which permanent
improvements may have been built, or beaches as to which a claim of
114
private ownership is asserted.”
Justice Mountain dissented from the majority’s holding,
specifically on the grounds that the doctrine had not been clearly
115
defined.
Therefore, the justice argued that the courts should
refrain from applying the doctrine to all municipally-owned dry sand
116
beaches.
More importantly, Justice Mountain expressed concerns
117
that such an application constituted a compensable taking.
Further, the justice dismissed the fact that a municipality held the
118
property in question.
According to Justice Mountain, the court
119
effectuated a taking despite its lack of eminent domain powers.
The justice summarized his view in the closing comments:
[N]o more land or water should be found to come within the
ambit of the public trust until such time as the scope and
contours of this doctrine are made clear. It is especially necessary
to decide what role, if any, the Legislature is entitled or required
to play. There should also be an initial determination as to
whether the inclusion of municipally owned dry beach land
within the public trust—making it available to indiscriminate

112

Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573–74. The court explained:
The fact that Deal has never dedicated the Casino beach to the use of
the general public is immaterial.
The beach is dedicated to
recreational uses including bathing, swimming, surf fishing and other
shore activities. If the area, which is under municipal ownership and
dedication, is subject to the Public Trust Doctrine, and we hold that it
is, all have the right to use and enjoy it.

Id.
113

Id. at 573 (“[I]n New Jersey, a proper application of the Public Trust Doctrine
requires that the municipally owned upland sand area adjacent to the tidal waters
must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.” (citation omitted)).
114
Id.
115
Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 575 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
116
Id. The justice explained: “[I]t seems to me improvident to rule now that great
stretches of our most valuable beach properties shall be subject to this amorphous
and ill-defined doctrine.” Id. at 576.
117
Id. at 577.
118
Id. at 578 (“It is the accepted law of New Jersey that municipal property, at least
if not held in a governmental capacity, when taken by the State, must be paid for.”).
119
Id.
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usage—is or is not a compensable taking and whether the
120
judiciary should purport to exercise the taking power.

Although the court expressly limited the holding in Van Ness to
municipal beaches, the state of the public trust doctrine was still
121
ambiguous.
Van Ness reiterated that the public trust doctrine is
122
dynamic. This left open the question as to whether the court would
“mold” the doctrine in the future to require access to and use of nonmunicipal beaches should the day come when the “public needs”
123
demand it. The answer came a few years later when the New Jersey
Supreme Court revisited the public trust doctrine and made sweeping
124
changes to its application.
C. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n
The holdings in Neptune City and Van Ness opened the door for
125
later modifications to the doctrine.
Irrespective of the rights
inherent in trust lands, the public’s rights are limited to the
126
Matthews,
geographic area covered by the public trust doctrine.
however, has threatened the balance by allowing the courts to also
expand the geographic breadth of the doctrine to include privately127
Matthews’ expansion of the public trust doctrine
owned dry sand.

120

Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 579 (Mountain, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
See Scott, supra note 111, at 43.
122
Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573.
123
See Scott, supra note 111, at 43.
124
See id. at 43–44. Professor Scott states: “In its decision the court disclaimed any
reliance on the traditional acquisitive theories of dedication or prescription. Instead,
it chose to ground itself squarely on a newly defined public trust doctrine.” Id. at 44.
125
Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s
in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719,
778 (1996) (“Neptune City v. Avon’s articulation of the public trust doctrine became
the linchpin of subsequent beach access cases in New Jersey.”).
126
Sarah C. Smith, Note, A Public Trust Argument for Public Access to Private
Conservation Land, 52 DUKE L. J. 629, 648–49 (2002). Smith writes: “The public trust
argument is, of course, limited to public trust land. Land that is not part of the
public trust will not be protected from a takings argument . . . .” Id. at 648.
127
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
The court in Matthews wrote:
We see no reason why rights under the public trust doctrine to use of
the upland dry sand area should be limited to municipally-owned
property. . . . Today, recognizing the increasing demand for our State’s
beaches and the dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine, we find
that the public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned
dry sand areas as reasonably necessary.
Id.
121
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in New Jersey provided ammunition to proponents for greater public
128
access to the beaches.
129
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n
presented a case
involving a quasi-municipal beach, Bay Head Improvement
Association (the “Association”), that limited use of its beaches to
130
members only.
The Association was a nonprofit corporation
131
Its membership was
owning and leasing beachfront property.
limited to residents of Bay Head who paid a yearly fee, and nonmembers were only permitted to use the beach after hours and in the
132
The plaintiffs claimed that the Association denied the
off-season.
133
public access and use of the beach.
Because the holdings in Neptune City and Van Ness were limited
134
to municipally-owned and controlled beaches, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey evaluated the public trust doctrine’s application to
135
privately-owned dry sand beaches.
In announcing that the public
may have a right to use the dry sand of private beaches, the court
reasoned that “without some means of access the public right to use
136
The court limited its
the foreshore would be meaningless.”
137
The
decision to beaches that the court deemed “quasi-municipal.”
court based this determination on the fact that “[t]he Association’s
activities paralleled those of a municipality in its operation of the
138
In making this determination, the New Jersey
beachfront.”
Supreme Court considered factors such as size, services rendered,
139
and maintenance functions. The majority reasoned: “When viewed
in its totality—its purposes, relationship with the municipality,
communal characteristic, activities, and virtual monopoly over the
Bay Head beachfront—the quasi-public nature of the Association is
128

See Morris, supra note 5, at 1022–23; Scott, supra note 111, at 44.
471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
130
Id. at 359.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 358. The original parties to the suit included the neighboring town of
Point Pleasant as a plaintiff and the town of Bay Head as a defendant. However, the
claim against Bay Head was dismissed because it did not own the beach. Eventually,
Point Pleasant stopped pursuing its claims. Id.
134
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363.
135
Id. at 363–64.
136
Id. at 364. The court articulated that “[r]easonable enjoyment of the
foreshore and the sea cannot be realized unless some enjoyment of the dry sand area
is also allowed.” Id. at 365.
137
Id. at 365–66.
138
Id. at 368.
139
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 368.
129

RECKORD FINAL.DOC

2005]

10/12/2005 5:53:21 PM

COMMENT

265

140

apparent.” The court in Matthews did not limit its holding to access
141
Instead, it granted the public an additional public trust
issues.
right, the right to use the dry sand of private beaches in certain
142
circumstances. While the court greatly expanded the public’s trust
rights, it did warn that the right to access and use private dry sand is
not a right to unrestricted access. The court further noted that the
public interest is protected where there is some reasonable access to
143
The opinion in Matthews, however, is quite significant
the water.
for several reasons. First, it accomplishes this right of access through
its interpretation of the public trust doctrine, not by any other
144
Quoting
property principles, such as dedication or easement.
Neptune City, New Jersey’s highest court again reiterated the dynamic
145
nature of the doctrine.
Second, the opinion directly avoided
146
Instead, the
applying the doctrine to purely private beaches.
holding is limited to quasi-municipal beaches like those involved in
147
the case.
Nevertheless, the court did decide that “private land is
not immune from a possible right of access to the foreshore for
swimming or bathing purposes, nor is it immune from the possibility
that some of the dry sand may be used by the public incidental to the
148
In sum, the New Jersey Supreme
right of bathing and swimming.”
Court limited its holding to quasi-municipal beaches, but added a
disclaimer that circumstances may warrant application to private
149
beaches in the future.
D. Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.
On July 26, 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the
150
most recent beach access and use dispute. The court picked up on
the expansion of the public interest in private beachfront property
where Matthews left off. In Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach

140

Id.
Id. at 365 (“The bather’s right in the upland sands is not limited to passage.”).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365 (quoting Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of
Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972)).
146
Id. at 369. The court declined to rule on the Public Advocate’s claim that all
private beaches should be open to the public. Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005)
[hereinafter Raleigh II].
141
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151

Club, Inc., the court held that the public cannot be restricted from
access and use of Atlantis Beach Club (“Atlantis”), a private beach,
even though the court never expressly found that Atlantis was “quasi152
municipal.”
Atlantis is located in the Diamond Beach neighborhood of
Lower Township, and its western boundary is along an unpaved
153
section of Raleigh Avenue.
The beach belonging to Seapointe
154
Village (“Seapointe”), north of Atlantis, is open to the public.
Because of limited access to the beachfront, members of Raleigh
Avenue Beach Association (“Association”), comprised of residents
living on Raleigh Avenue in the Diamond Beach section, are forced
155
to walk one-half mile to reach the nearest free access point.
In
1996, Atlantis went private, charging fees to its members to access
156
Problems arose between Atlantis and the
and use the beach.
Association when a member of the Association was charged with
trespassing while crossing Atlantis’ beach, the most direct route to his
157
Subsequently, Atlantis “filed an Order to Show Cause and
home.
Verified Complaint against [the trespasser], other unnamed persons,
Lower Township, and the State of New Jersey” to permanently enjoin
158
Atlantis also sought
the public from trespassing upon its property.
a declaration that it was not required to permit the public to access or
159
use its beach. In response, the Association filed a complaint against
Atlantis seeking free access and use of a reasonable amount of dry
sand, claiming that Atlantis’ beach is subject to the public trust

151

879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
Id. at 120–21, 124. While the court recognized that Matthews’ narrow holding
was limited to its unique facts (i.e. the public nature of the Bay Head Improvement
Association and its close relationship to the municipality), the court nevertheless
disregarded the first determination made in Matthews: that the Association was quasipublic, and therefore, the holdings of Neptune City and Van Ness applied to it. See
infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
153
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 113–15.
154
Id. at 114. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection required
Seapointe’s beach to be open to the public as a condition of its 1987 permit issued
pursuant to the Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-1 to -21
(West 2004). Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 114.
155
Id. at 115. The court noted that “[a]ccess is blocked by condominium
buildings located at the terminus of the other streets in the area.” Id.
156
Id. at 115–16. Before Atlantis established the private club, the beach was free
and open to the public. Id. at 115. The fees in 2002 were $700 per family per season
for eight beach tags. Id.
157
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 116.
158
Id.
159
Id.
152
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160

doctrine.
In addition, the Department of Environmental
Protection (“DEP”) “sought a ruling on the question whether the
beach along the Atlantic Ocean in the Diamond Beach area is subject
to the public trust doctrine such that an individual can walk along the
ocean shore on the Atlantis property without fear of prosecution for
161
trespassing . . . .”
162
In reversing the trial court
and holding that Atlantis’
beachfront is subject to the public trust doctrine, the Appellate
Division placed much emphasis on the fact that the Township did not
163
The court thus held that
provide similar services to the public.
Atlantis, a private owner, must permit the public to vertically as well
as horizontally access its property and to make reasonable use of its
dry sand beach as necessary to accommodate the public’s recreational
164
In addition, the court held that Atlantis
rights in the foreshore.
could only charge a “commercially reasonable fee” to those members
of the public who remained on the beach for longer periods of
165
The Appellate Division found that the fees Atlantis charged
time.
for access and use of its beach “discriminated against individuals and
small families by forcing them to pay an amount bearing no rational
relationship to the cost associated with individual use of the
166
property.”
Relying heavily on Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court
167
affirmed the Appellate Division.
Purporting to apply the Matthews
factors, the court held that the public trust doctrine applied to

160

Id. Around this time, “the DEP issued an Administrative Order and Notice of
Civil Administrative Penalty Assessment . . . to Atlantis for conducting CAFRAregulated activities on its property without obtaining required permits.” Id.
161
Id. at 117.
162
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 117. The trial court held that Atlantis must permit
access to the ocean and allow the public use of a three-foot wide strip of its dry sand.
Id. Further, the court held that the DEP’s authority does not extend to the
regulation of the use of Atlantis’ dry sand. Id.
163
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d 19, 22 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005) [hereinafter Raleigh I].
164
Id. at 30. The court further stated: “We are satisfied that Atlantis’s attempts to
limit access to, and use of, its upland sand are hostile to the public trust doctrine and
not sustainable on appeal.” Id.
165
Id. at 22. The Appellate Division stated: “All members of the public who use
the waterfront are entitled to use Atlantis’s adjacent upland sand for extended
periods and must be afforded a fair opportunity to pay a reasonable single-person
fee.” Id. at 33.
166
Id.
167
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 113.
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Atlantis and that Atlantis must open its beach to all members of the
168
public.
Unlike the court in Matthews, however, the court did not focus
169
on the quasi-public factor.
The court acknowledged the quasipublic nature of the Improvement Association in Matthews, but never
170
addressed the issue of whether Atlantis was in fact quasi-public.
Rather, the court proceeded to apply the Matthews factors to
determine the “appropriate level of accommodation” of the interests
171
In doing so, the court looked at the “[l]ocation of
of the owner.
the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, extent and availability
of publicly-owned upland sand area, nature and extent of the public
172
demand, and usage of the upland sand land by the owner . . . .” By
only applying the factors, the court did an injustice to the holding in
Matthews. The court in Matthews first determined that the beach at
issue so mirrored the activities and roles of a municipality that the
173
Once it is
holdings of Neptune City and Van Ness applied to it.
determined that the beach is quasi-public, the next prong of the test
is to determine the amount of dry sand that will satisfy the public’s
rights while, at the same time, accommodating the interests of the
174
It is also important to note that although the court in
owner.
Matthews held that private land is not immune from public access and
use, the court added that the public’s right is not one of “unrestricted
access” and its rights are satisfied where there is reasonable access to
175
the water.
Dissenting in Raleigh, Justice Wallace pointed out that the
Matthews court held that the upland dry sand had to be open to all

168

Id.
Id. at 120–21.
170
Id. at 121. The court in Raleigh II, discussing the quasi-public nature of the
Improvement Association in Matthews, stated:
The Improvement Association was closely connected with the
municipality, which provided at various points in time, office space,
liability insurance, and funding, among other things. That symbiotic
relationship, as well as the public nature of the activities conducted by
the Improvement Association, led the Court to conclude that the
Improvement Association was in reality a “quasi-public body” . . . .
Id. at 120–21 (citing Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 366–68
(N.J. 1984)).
171
Id. at 121 (citing Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365–66).
172
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 121–23 (quoting Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365).
173
See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 368.
174
Id. at 365–66.
175
Id. at 364.
169
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176

because it was quasi-public in nature.
In Raleigh, the court never
found Atlantis to be quasi-public; therefore, the primary focus should
have been on accommodating the interests of the owner, as Matthews
made clear. The court, however, held that Atlantis beach has to be
open to all in its entirety, begging the question: does this
177
accommodate the owner’s interest?
While Matthews did warn that circumstances may warrant finding
such rights in purely private beaches, it refrained from deciding the
issue and expressly stated:
We realize that considerable uncertainty will continue to
surround the question of the public's right to cross private land
and to use a portion of the dry sand as discussed above. Where
the parties are unable to agree as to the application of the
principles enunciated herein, the claim of the private owner shall
178
be honored until the contrary is established.

The court in Raleigh, however, focused primarily on the unavailability
179
180
of public beaches in the Township, public demand, the “La Vida
181
CAFRA permit condition,” and “the type of use by the current
176

Id. at 367–68; Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 127 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (“Thus, in
Matthews, the entirety of the beach was privately-owned, but by a quasi-public
organization.”). Justice Wallace filed a dissent, in which Justice Rivera-Soto joined.
See id. at 125.
177
The court in Matthews explained that
[w]hile the public's rights in private beaches are not co-extensive with
the rights enjoyed in municipal beaches, private landowners may not in
all instances prevent the public from exercising its rights under the
public trust doctrine. The public must be afforded reasonable access to
the foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand.
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365–66 (emphasis added). The court never held that the
public would be entitled to use and access of all of a private landowner’s upland dry
sand without first finding that the beach in question was quasi-public or quasimunicipal in nature.
178
Id. at 370.
179
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 121–22. While it is true that there are no publicly-owned
beaches in Lower Township, there are public beaches in Wildwood Crest, north of
Lower Township. See id. More importantly, Seapointe is a public beach that provides
lifeguards, public restrooms, showers, and parking. See id. at 114. Seapointe is
located north of La Vida, which is immediately west of Atlantis. Id.
180
Id. at 122. The court emphasized pubic demand, but in its discussion the
majority points only to the residents who live in walking distance of Atlantis. See id.
The court also mentions the general “enormous public interest in the New Jersey
shore . . . .” Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 122.
181
See id. at 122–23. The majority, in analyzing the “usage of the upland sand
land by the owner” factor, explained that Atlantis beach was open to the public prior
to 1996. Id. at 122. In 1986, La Vida Condominium’s CAFRA building permit was
conditioned on the homeowner’s association being responsible for public access to
the beach. Id. According to the Court, the fact that the permit describes a portion
of dry sand beach leads to the conclusion that the dry sand area was meant for public
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182

owner as a business enterprise.” Without finding that the particular
beach in issue was quasi-public or quasi-municipal, the court ordered
a private owner to provide services and open its property to the
183
public free of charge.
Further, the court held that the DEP will determine a reasonable
fee that Atlantis can charge to those members of the public who
184
choose to remain on its dry sand for a longer period of time.
The
court noted: “We expect that the DEP will use N.J.A.C. 7:7E-8.11(b)4,
which limits fees at publicly-owned beaches to an amount ‘required
to operate and maintain the facility’ as a guide, and that fees will not
be approved if they operate to ‘limit access by placing an
185
unreasonable . . . burden on the public.’”
Administration of this
type of order is not likely to be a simple task. It is unclear what an
unreasonable burden is and how long a person must remain on the
dry sand before a fee can be charged. Because the public may make
use of the dry sand area to rest and relax between swimming, it will
be difficult to determine what is reasonable access and what
186
In addition, even though
constitutes a sufficient area of dry sand.
Atlantis may charge a fee to those who remain on its beach, the court
use. See id. at 123. The court noted, however, that it would not “consider the permit
dispositive on the issue of public use” because neither party made it. Id. Yet, the
majority “highlighted” the CAFRA permit condition as evidence of “longstanding
public access to and use of the beach” at the end of the opinion. Raleigh II, 879 A.2d
at 124.
182
Id.
183
See id.; Raleigh I, 851 A.2d at 30. Atlantis did not object to providing lifeguard
services free of charge to those members of the pubic who used the ocean, but did
not remain on its dry sand. Raleigh I, 851 A.2d at 30. Atlantis did, however, object to
the DEP’s jurisdiction over the determination of fees for those who remained on its
beach for longer periods of time. See id. at 30–31. The Appellate Division held that
the DEP did have jurisdiction and that it could review fees charged by Atlantis to
those who used its beach. See id. at 31–32. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed
the Appellate Division’s judgment regarding fees. See Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 124–25.
184
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 125.
185
Id. (quoting Raleigh I, 851 A.2d at 33). The court acknowledged “that Atlantis,
as a private entity, should be allowed to include expenses actually incurred for
reasonable management services (in addition to reimbursement for other costs) in
the fee calculation.” Id. Further, the court noted that Atlantis has the “independent
and inherent right . . . to provide cabanas for rent . . . or to engage in other similar
business enterprises for profit, e.g., beach chair rentals, food concessions, etc.” Id.
186
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984)
(“Precisely what privately-owned upland sand area will be available and required to
satisfy the public’s rights under the public trust doctrine will depend on the
circumstances.”). The court in Matthews did not lay out a precise formula. Instead,
the court noted the rule in broad terms: “private landowners may not in all instances
prevent the public from exercising its rights under the public trust doctrine. The
public must be afforded reasonable access to the foreshore as well as a suitable area
for recreation on the dry sand.” Id. at 366.
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is effectively disallowing a private entity the right to profit by only
187
permitting Atlantis to charge a “reasonable fee.”
Justice Wallace found that the majority incorrectly held that the
188
application of the factors weighed in favor of the plaintiff.
Specifically, the dissent pointed out that the second factor, “the
extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area,” favored a
judgment for Atlantis because Seapointe, a neighboring beach, is
189
The dissent also found that the final factor,
open to the public.
“usage of the upland sand by the owner,” weighed in favor of the
defendant because Atlantis had been operating as a private beach for
190
the last nine years.
The dissent, in applying the test and rules of Matthews, found
that the public’s rights would be satisfied by “granting access to the
ocean and an easement across the private sand area owned by the
Atlantis Beach Club to access the beach at Seapointe” and
“expand[ing] the horizontal access across defendant’s property to a
191
ten-foot-wide strip above the high water mark.”
Justice Wallace
explained that ten feet of dry sand would be enough space for the
public to enjoy the ocean and the beach while, at the same time,
192
The dissent’s
accommodating the rights of the private owner.
approach to resolving this issue is true to the holding in Matthews,
which emphasized the need to accommodate the interest of the
193
The majority’s conclusion that no accommodation
private owner.
of the owner’s interest is necessary leads to the question: Is this a
compensable taking? Justice Mountain, in his dissenting opinion in
Van Ness, expressed such concerns:
Suddenly the magic wand labeled “public trust” is gently waved
and, lo and behold, what had been a beach reserved solely for
residents of the Borough has been transformed into a beach open
to the general public. It matters not at all in what terms this bit of
187

See Raleigh I, 851 A.2d at 33. Indeed, the appellate court stated: “The notion
that lands are to be held in public trust, protected and regulated for the common
use and benefit, is incompatible with the concept of profit.” Id.
188
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 127–28 (Wallace, J., dissenting). The dissent wrote: “In
balancing the above factors, it is obvious that the greater weight favors access to the
ocean and the use of the water below the mean high water mark.” Id. at 128.
189
Id. Justice Wallace explained that Seapointe’s open beach “strikes a proper
balance between the public trust doctrine, which requires reasonable access and use
of the ocean and beaches, and a private owner’s right to use its property as it deems
fit.” Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 125–26.
192
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 129 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
193
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365–66 (N.J. 1984).
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judicial legerdemain is couched. The fact remains that one right
in the bundle of rights we call ownership has been destroyed—the
right to exclude others. There has been a compensable taking,
accomplished by judicial act. But the judiciary may not exercise
194
the power of eminent domain!

III. AREAS OF CONFLICT
Because the public has rights to the land subject to the public
trust doctrine, private landowners are in a unique position. As littoral
195
owners, they also have interests in the wet sand area.
The primary
reason for owning beachfront property is its proximity to the ocean.
Therefore, it is no surprise that the wet sand area presents conflicts
between these two groups. These conflicts primarily exist in regards
to how the public may access the foreshore, the rights associated with
the wet sand area, and, now, the areas the public is permitted to
196
use.
Historically, “the foreshore of the entire coast is said to be held
in trust for the public for the explicit purposes of navigation and
197
fishing.”
In more recent times, states, such as New Jersey, have
expanded the category of uses permitted in the foreshore, while
198
other states have not.
In states with a more liberal doctrine, the
public’s rights were eventually “extended to those incidental
199
privileges that were necessary for the public enjoyment of a right.”
Some states agree that recreational uses are among those that the
doctrine permits, while other states maintain that the historical
200
The Supreme
purposes of navigation and fishing are exhaustive.
Court of New Jersey rationalized increasing the geographic scope by
linking the amount of space needed by the public to the recreational
201
In doing so, the New
rights covered under the trust doctrine.
Jersey Supreme Court inferred that a right to swim or sunbathe is
useless without the right to relax and utilize some part of the dry
sand, demonstrating that the types of uses permitted directly
194

Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 578 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2.
196
Welby, supra note 59, at 70.
197
Id. at 85.
198
Id. at 87. For example, “Massachusetts’ judicial opinions proclaim that the
only justification for taking the use of private land without compensation is the
improvement of fishing or navigation—the two areas originally covered by the public
trust.” Id. at 88.
199
Fernandez, supra note 49, at 628.
200
Welby, supra note 59, at 87–88.
201
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
195
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correlate to the amount of land that will be considered subject to the
202
trust.
Because of the failures of prescription, dedication, and
customary use, the courts have resorted to expanding the public trust
doctrine to grant further rights to the public without a need for
203
compensation.
Another benefit of using the public trust doctrine
that proponents of public beach access cite is that an expansion of
the doctrine amounts to changes to all private beachfront owners
204
As a result, one
regardless of the litigants to the instant suit.
judicial determination changes the nature of the rights of all private
205
This expansion is of great concern because it
landowners.
effectuates a denial of due process to all owners who are affected by
such judicial activism.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has employed the public trust
doctrine to increase the permitted rights and uses and the
206
geographic scope of the doctrine.
Specifically, in Matthews, the
New Jersey Supreme Court warned private landowners that “the
opportunity to swim [a right recognized in New Jersey] may be
entirely dependent upon the public’s ability to reach the
207
foreshore.”
Although the court did not hold that the public could
vertically access private beaches, it did expressly caution that
208
circumstances might warrant such a decision. The court’s decision
in Raleigh found such circumstances to exist when it mandated that a
private entity, not expressly found to be quasi-public, open its beach
209
to all and that the state can determine the fee it may charge. Such
limitless expansion affects the entire coastline of the state and
negatively impacts all oceanfront landowners, despite the fact that
210
Expanding the doctrine beyond
none were ever before the court.
that for which it was designed may be done out of good intention to
enhance public rights, but it also significantly disregards the private
property rights that Americans cherish.
202

Id.
See Welby, supra note 59, at 85–87.
204
See id. at 87.
205
See id.
206
See Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571
(N.J. 1978); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47
(N.J. 1972).
207
Welby, supra note 59, at 86.
208
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363–64.
209
Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 124–25.
210
See Welby, supra note 59, at 87.
203
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While the rights of the public to the wet sand area are
guaranteed and protected as a matter of law, the area landward of the
211
high tide line is not.
Urged by proponents of increased public
212
rights to beaches, courts are now willing to entertain expansion of
213
the geographic areas covered by the public trust doctrine.
Specifically, Raleigh demonstrates that the New Jersey Supreme Court
is willing to permit public use of and access to privately-owned dry
214
This willingness threatens the security enjoyed by
sand beaches.
private landowners and the rights to exclusive use and ownership of
private property. Furthermore, the lack of compensation to such
owners is unconstitutional.
PART IV. THE SUPREME COURT—THE PUBLIC TRUST
AND THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE
A. The Takings Doctrine
The Fifth Amendment requires compensation after a
215
Thus, when the
government seizure of private property.
government acts to protect the public trust lands in a way that
diminishes private interests in the land, “those adversely affected will
claim that there is a ‘taking’ of some private property interest for
216
which compensation is required.” If, however, a court in a decision
redefines the boundaries of the trust lands, “a private property
interest thought to exist may be defined out of existence” along with
217
A court, however, should not be permitted in a
the takings claim.
single case to broadly redefine these boundaries affecting all
landowners.
Since its recognition of the public trust doctrine in Illinois
Central, the Supreme Court has rarely interfered with the states’
authority to administer their own versions of the public trust
218
The lack of interpretations of the doctrine by the
doctrine.
Supreme Court has allowed a variety of differing state policies

211

Id. at 75.
Id. (“Beach access advocates argue that this dry sand area is crucial to the full
enjoyment of the ocean itself.”).
213
See Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 112; Matthews, 471 A.2d 355.
214
See Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 112.
215
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
216
KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2.
217
Id.
218
See Morris, supra note 5, at 1019–20.
212
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concerning the treatment of private waterfront property.
Outside
of the public trust doctrine, however, the Supreme Court has not
hesitated to act when the primary issue in the case concerns a takings
220
claim.
The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from loss of private
221
property as a result of government action.
Although the Fifth
Amendment is applicable to the federal government, the states are
222
also bound by it by means of the Fourteenth Amendment. Physical
takings by the government for its use or for use by the public are “per
223
se takings” that demand compensation.
Physical takings occur
“when the state physically intrudes (or authorizes third parties to do
so) onto private property, thus abrogating the private owner’s right to
224
The right to exclude others coincides with a
exclude others.”
225
property owner’s right to exclusive possession.
226
In regulatory takings, “government actions do not encroach
upon or occupy the property [but] affect and limit its use to such an
227
extent that a taking occurs.”
The Supreme Court has outlined
some factors to consider when determining whether or not a
particular governmental action is a regulatory taking requiring
228
compensation. If the regulation “denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of the land,” the state must compensate the
229
Even if the regulation does not deny all economically
owner.
230
beneficial or productive use of land, it may still be a taking. Other
factors the Court will take into consideration include: “the
regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which
219

See id.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
221
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
222
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
223
See, e.g., Jesse W. Barton, Note, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v.
United States: Why it was Correctly Decided and What This Means for Water Rights, 25
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 109, 116 (2002).
224
Id. Any physical invasion onto private property is a physical taking regardless
of amount of land occupied. Id.
225
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982)
(“[P]ermanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power
to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make
no nonpossessory use of the property.”).
226
Barton, supra note 223, at 117.
227
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922)).
228
See id.
229
Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
230
See id.
220
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the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed
231
Taken
expectations, and the character of the government action.”
together, these factors, once evaluated, will determine whether
232
compensation is necessary.
Two important Supreme Court cases, Nollan v. California Coastal
233
234
Commission and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, evaluated
state regulations of oceanfront property, demonstrating the Court’s
position when a taking claim is raised. In each case, the states were
attempting to gain additional public beach and/or access through
235
legislation or regulation. However, neither state had compensated
236
the private owners. The Court rejected the states’ attempts to grant
further access rights to the public on private beaches under the
237
auspices of its police powers.
B. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court
held that “to obtain easements of access across private property the
238
State must proceed through its eminent domain power.”
The
California Coastal Commission (the “Commission”) had granted a
building permit to the landowners, the Nollans, with the express
condition that they provide a public easement across their oceanfront
239
The Nollans brought suit to invalidate the condition,
property.
claiming that it violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth
240
Amendment. The Superior Court of Ventura County held in favor
241
of the Nollans, finding no rational justification for the condition.
242
The California Court of Appeals reversed and flatly rejected the
constitutional claim since the condition only diminished the overall

231

Id. The Court utilizes the test outlined in Pennsylvania Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City , 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
232
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617.
233
483 U.S. 825 (1987) [hereinafter Nollan II].
234
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
235
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan II, 483 U.S. 825.
236
See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; Nollan II, 483 U.S. 825.
237
See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C.
238
Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 832.
239
Id. at 828.
240
Id. at 829.
241
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (1986)
[hereinafter Nollan I].
242
Id. at 32.
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value of the property to the Nollans and did not “deprive [them] of
243
the reasonable use of [their] property.”
The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that even
244
a slight diminution in value may be enough to constitute a taking.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia elaborated:
In Loretto we observed that where governmental action results in
“[a] permanent physical occupation” of the property, by the
government itself or by others, “our cases uniformly have found a
taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
245
minimal economic impact on the owner.”

According to Justice Scalia, the proper focus should be on the nexus
between the problem created by the development and the condition
246
in the permit.
Regulation is not a compensable taking if it
“‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not
247
‘den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.’”
After determining that the state’s interest in protecting the
beachfront is a legitimate one, the Court looked at the relationship
between that interest and the condition on the Nollans’ building
248
The Commission argued that the Nollans’ new house
permit.
would burden the public by interfering with “visual access” to the
249
beaches. In turn, the Commission claimed, this interference would
create a “psychological barrier” to the beaches, leading to demands
250
for beach access.
The Commission argued that those demands
could only be satisfied by conditioning building permits on the
251
coastline to those who are willing to provide public easements. The
Court rejected this argument and considered the relationship too
252
attenuated.
Furthermore, the Court was skeptical about the

243

Id. at 30 (citing Grupe v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 595–96
(1985)).
244
Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 831–32.
245
Id. at 832 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 434–35 (1982)).
246
Id. at 834.
247
Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
248
Id. at 838.
249
Id.
250
Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 838.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 838–39. Justice Scalia wrote:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new
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Commission’s underlying motive because “there is heightened risk
that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement,
253
rather than the stated police-power objective.”
The Court emphatically noted that a “‘permanent physical
occupation’ has occurred . . . where individuals are given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real
property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the
254
premises.”
Thus, in order to gain vertical access to the ocean, the
state must compensate the private landowners or satisfy the nexus test
outlined by Justice Scalia: the state must show that a regulation
substantially advances a legitimate state interest without denying the
255
Since the Commission
owner economically viable use of the land.
failed to meet this test, regulations like those involved in Nollan are
256
not permitted without compensation to the private landowners.
Nollan also addressed basic American principles concerning private
257
The Court classified the right to exclude others as “‘one
property.
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
258
characterized as property.’”
The Court declared that if a state
wants to secure an easement in order to provide beach access to its
house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any
“psychological barrier” to using the public beaches . . . .
Id. at 838.
253
Id. at 841.
254
Id. at 832. The Supreme Court, therefore, expressly refuted the argument
made by beach access proponents that the public’s presence on private property to
get to and from the ocean is minimal and is not an occupation in any permanent
sense.
255
Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 834. While a state may claim that beach access is a
legitimate state interest, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would find loss of
the right to profit to be a denial of economically viable use of land, requiring
compensation.
256
See id. at 839. Specifically, the Court stated: “We therefore find that the
Commission’s imposition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of
its land-use power . . . .” Id. In Nollan, an easement could have been required
without compensation if it was narrowly tailored to addressing the externalities
caused by the development. Nollan is different than a case like Raleigh because
regulations, like those in Nollan, are clearly subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.
With expansions of the public trust, however, the owner has no opportunity to
challenge the state court’s judgment that resulted in a substantial impairment of the
owner’s rights unless the Supreme Court is willing to grant certiorari.
257
See id. at 841.
The Court stated: “California is free to advance its
‘comprehensive program,’ if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this
‘public purpose,’ . . . but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it must
pay for it.” Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V.).
258
Id. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 433 (1982)).
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citizens, it must compensate the private property owner or be
259
The Supreme
substantially advancing a legitimate state interest.
Court’s loyalty to traditional property values may be the only
roadblock for states that intend to strip landowners of their Fifth
Amendment rights. However, the Court has yet to act when state
court decisions, not state legislation, are responsible for “taking”
260
private property.
Nollan is a significant case with respect to the battle for public
access and expansion of the public trust zone. First, it demonstrates
that the Supreme Court will not allow the states to disguise takings
261
Second, it expressly
through the use of their police powers.
262
categorizes exclusive possession of private property as essential.
C. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Lucas was another victory in the fight to protect waterfront
owners because it further solidified the notion that government
action that reduces the value of another’s property cannot be
263
excused on the ground that it serves to benefit the public. Further,
Lucas clarified the “harmful or noxious uses” exception to the
264
Lucas involved a property owner of
compensation requirement.
265
two adjacent oceanfront lots.
The owner, Lucas, purchased the
land for $975,000 in 1986 with the intention of building single-family
266
However, in 1988, South Carolina passed the Beachfront
homes.
Management Act (“Act”), which banned Lucas from building on the
267
lots.
Lucas alleged that the Act, in effect, constituted a taking
268
without compensation. The trial court agreed, holding that the bar
on construction rendered the property valueless and required
269
compensation.
However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
disagreed and reversed, basing its holding on the principle that,
259

Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 841–42.
In order to secure Supreme Court review, litigants would be prudent to assert a
Fourteenth Amendment claim as early as possible. The procedural impediments of
preserving the takings claim for appeal are beyond the scope of this Comment,
which advocates judicial restraint by state courts to avoid the impropriety of judicial
takings altogether.
261
See Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 841.
262
Id. at 831.
263
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
264
See id. at 1022–23.
265
Id. at 1006.
266
Id. at 1007.
267
Id.
268
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
269
Id.
260
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because the legislation aimed to prevent a serious harm by preserving
the coastal areas, no compensation is required regardless of the effect
270
on property value.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and laid out some
271
First, the Court pronounced
foundational rules regarding takings.
the general rule that, if a regulation deprives the landowner of all
economic use of the property or renders the property valueless, the
272
government must compensate. The Court also noted that the state
may “resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use
273
interests were not part of [the owner’s] title to begin with.” Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia qualified the noxious use exception
274
upon which the Supreme Court of South Carolina relied.
The
Justice explained that “the legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use
justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical
275
rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.”
Rather, the Court will consider numerous factors when
276
determining whether compensation is due.
Justice Scalia stated
that the primary inquiry involves looking into the “nature of the
owner’s estate” to determine whether the regulation deprives the
277
The
owner of a right he had at the time the estate was acquired.
second inquiry, according to the majority, involves an analysis similar
to that of state nuisance law, whereby a court engages in a balancing

270

Id. at 900–01.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–32 (1992).
272
Id. at 1027. It is likely that Atlantic Beach Club would have a strong argument
that the state court’s decision prevents it from profiting, and, therefore, deprives
Atlantis Beach Club of all economic use.
273
Id. This is particularly problematic in the area of the public trust expansions
because once the scope of the doctrine is expanded, the rights of the private owner
are retroactively altered. In other words, the courts view the owner as never having
had such rights. The retroactive application of the doctrine further supports a
limited interpretation of the public trust doctrine.
274
Id. at 1031.
275
Id. at 1026.
276
Id. at 1030.
277
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. Because of the retroactive nature of the public trust
doctrine, the Court should not look to the expanded doctrine to determine the
nature of the owner’s estate because that very expansion is the source of the takings
claim. Rather, the Court should look to the owner’s estate at the date of acquisition
and compare it to the owner’s estate after the state court decision. Otherwise, state
courts’ decisions regarding the public trust doctrine would be immune from review.
271
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of the harm posed by the owner’s conduct or use of the land and the
278
benefit of restricting the owner’s rights to the public.
With respect to the second inquiry, the state must do more than
simply declare the uses the landowner is engaged in or desires to
279
engage in as against the public interest.
Instead, the state must
demonstrate that the uses or desired uses of the owner violate
280
principles of nuisance and property law.
While the Council in
Lucas relied on the noxious use exception, the second inquiry is
281
based upon existing background property principles.
The public
trust doctrine would likely be considered a background state property
282
In a case challenging the expansion of the public trust,
principle.
however, the focus should be on the preexisting interpretation of the
doctrine. This comports with the Supreme Court’s instruction that
“[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property
283
Accordingly, a
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”
newly defined public trust doctrine cannot be a background property
284
principle. Therefore, the analysis should focus either on the public
trust doctrine as defined at the date of acquisition or, at least, on the
doctrine as defined before the expansion. This is the logical
278

Id. at 1030–32. Public nuisance “encompasses a multitude of offenses against
the public.” Finnel, supra note 5, at 646. “A public nuisance is a condition that
interferes with a substantial public right.” Walker, supra note 1, at 452. According to
the majority in Lucas, the second inquiry will entail an:
analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and
resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s
proposed activities, the social value of the claimant’s activities and their
suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease with which
the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government . . . .
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31 (internal citations omitted).
279
See id. at 1031.
280
Id. at 1031–32.
281
Id. at 1030. State law determines background principles of property law. Id.
282
For a discussion of the vitality of the public trust doctrine as a background
property principle, see Michael A. Blumm and Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy:
The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
321, 341–44 (2005).
283
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (parentheses in original).
284
In other words, “newly discovering or expanding such principles in order to
protect resources now deemed valuable and in the public interest to preserve is
inconsistent and irreconcilable with the protection of private rights in land
traditionally associated with our system of government in the United States.” David
L. Callies and J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law:
Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust “Exceptions”and the (Mis) Use of InvestmentBacked Expectations, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 378 (2002)
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interpretation of the application of the test in Lucas because the first
inquiry focuses on the nature of the owner’s estate at the time it was
acquired. Thus, the second inquiry should also be limited to the time
of acquisition.
Lucas provides that the restriction placed upon the owner must
285
be one that comports with common law property principles. While
286
the public trust doctrine is a common law principle, an expansion
that so distorts the original interpretation would not satisfy the
287
second prong of the test.
To determine if the use sought to be
restricted is one that is based upon a common law prohibition, Justice
Scalia proposed looking at whether “a particular use has long been
engaged in by similarly situated owners” and whether “other
landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use
288
Private owners on the beach have long
denied to the claimant.”
been permitted to restrict access and use of the land above the mean
289
high tide line.
Only in the cases of municipally-owned or quasimunicipal beaches has the public trust doctrine mandated access and
290
use of the entire dry sand area.
Likewise, private homeowners on
the beachfront may continue to exclude others from the mean high
291
The public trust doctrine,
tide line to the line of vegetation.
historically and traditionally, only requires that the public have use of
292
the wet sand area. This leads to the conclusion that the state action
“goes beyond what the relevant background principles would
293
dictate,” and therefore, “compensation must be paid to sustain it.”

285

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–32.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 64 F. Supp.
2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999) (applying the public trust doctrine as a defense to a takings
claim and using the holding in Matthews as a guide). This Comment does not argue
that the public trust doctrine is not a background property principle. Rather, this
Comment urges state courts not to reformulate the doctrine beyond its traditional
scope. The traditional scope of the doctrine, therefore, is a permissible defense to a
takings claim as it is rooted in common law.
287
See Callies and Breemer, supra note 284, at 372 (explaining that “the fit
between the public trust and the background principles exception fades as the
doctrine drifts from its historical moorings”).
288
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
289
See Welby, supra note 59, at 86.
290
See generally Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355
(N.J. 1984); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978); Borough of
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
291
See generally Matthews, 471 A.2d 355; Van Ness, 393 A.2d 571; Neptune City, 294
A.2d 47.
292
KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2.
293
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
286
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Lucas, like Nollan, provides the landowner with further support
against unwarranted government seizures. Lucas is particularly
helpful in that it clarifies the law regarding takings for the benefit of
294
the public or to prevent harmful uses.
Presently, a state may not
simply categorize a use as harmful or claim that the reason for the
295
regulation is to provide the public with a benefit. Rather, the state
will have to establish its argument in court to escape compensating
296
the owner under the law of property.
In sum, the state “‘may not
transform private property into public property without
297
compensation.’”
D. Linking the Takings Doctrine to the Expansion of the
Public Trust Doctrine
The takings doctrine is of particular importance in the area of
the public trust doctrine. First, it provides private landowners with a
298
way to combat overzealous state actions.
It is especially effective
299
Second, the
when the government action at issue is legislation.
takings doctrine emphasizes the value of private property in our
300
society.
Because of its importance, the Constitution provides
safeguards for individuals whose property is threatened with
301
Therefore, the Supreme Court must uphold this
seizure.
constitutional right to be free from seizure of private property
without compensation. It is unclear, however, whether the Court is
willing to police state judicial actions that result in loss of private
302
property.
The issue of the Takings Clause as it applies to judicial
303
experts
have
action has never been directly addressed. Most
expressed doubts as to the likelihood of the Court’s subjecting
304
judicial actions to the protections of the Fifth Amendment.
Opponents to subjecting judicial regulation to Takings Clause

294

See id. at 1038–42.
Id. at 1038–42.
296
Id. at 1032.
297
Id. at 1031 (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 164 (1980)).
298
See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see discussion supra Parts IV.B–C.
299
Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism
About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 423, 428 (1995).
300
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see discussion supra Part IV.A.
301
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see discussion supra Part IV.A.
302
Grant, supra note 299, at 428.
303
Id.
304
Thompson, supra note 25, at 1451.
295
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requirements claim it “would constrain societally needed change too
much [and] that takings protections are less necessary for such
regulation because [they are] typically more principled and
305
nonpolitical than legislative or administrative regulation.”
The Fifth Amendment may also provide protection to
306
landowners from arbitrary judicial actions.
In other words,
expansion of the public trust doctrine presents the issue of whether
such court actions should be reviewed in light of the Takings
307
It presents the question of whether a court, a
Clause.
governmental body just like a legislature, may grant public use and
308
The
access rights to private property without due compensation.
takings doctrine is interpreted as a protection from government
309
action that results in loss of private property.
As often analogized,
310
If the state directly
property rights are like a bundle of sticks.
removes one of the sticks from the bundle or claims it as its own, “it is
considered a taking and the state will be forced to pay
311
compensation.” Considered in this light, it is difficult to reconcile a
court’s expansion of the scope of the public trust doctrine that results
in a change to the owners’ bundle with such an expansion not
312
In essence, “by exempting courts from
requiring compensation.
the takings protections, we create an imbalance that invites the state
to attempt to accomplish through the judiciary what it cannot
accomplish through the other branches of government—thereby
unnecessarily skewing the appropriate division of responsibility
313
between the branches.”
314
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court held that a state
court’s enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violated the
305

Grant, supra note 299, at 428.
See Thompson, supra note 25, at 1451 (analyzing the issue of exempting
judicial determinations from the takings protections).
307
Id.
308
Id. (“Faced by growing environmental, conservationist, and recreational
demands, for example, state courts have recently begun redefining a variety of
property interests to increase public or governmental rights, concomitantly shrinking
the sphere of private dominion.”).
309
See Barton, supra note 223, at 116.
310
Id. (“Each stick in this bundle represents a right that the owner holds against
others. Some of these rights include the right to exclude others from the property,
the right to sell the property, the right to transfer the property, the right to possess,
and the right to use.”).
311
Id.
312
Thompson, supra note 25, at 1544.
313
Id.
314
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
306
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315

Fourteenth Amendment.
Specifically, the Court held that state
judicial enforcement is state action for the purposes of the
316
Amendment. The opinion noted that “it has never been suggested
that state court action is immunized . . . simply because the act is that
317
of the judicial branch of the state government.”
In the same way,
judicial action should be considered state action for the purposes of
the Fifth Amendment. State court decisions that effectuate takings of
private property should not be immune from the constitutional
requirement of compensation. As the Shelley Court clarified, the
relevant inquiry should be whether the state court action resulted in a
318
constitutional violation. Just as the Supreme Court interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should interpret the Fifth
Amendment to “[make] void ‘State action of every kind’ which is
inconsistent with the guaranties therein contained, and [should
extend] to manifestations of ‘State authority in the shape of laws,
319
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.’”
Constitutional
protections not only prohibit certain executive and legislative actions,
they prohibit certain governmental actions in general, including
those of the judiciary. Allowing one branch to violate the protections
that our forefathers considered essential to free government defeats
320
the purpose of having such protections at all.
V. CONCLUSION
All of the New Jersey cases involving interpretation of the public
trust doctrine show a steady expansion of public rights to municipal
315

Id. at 14.
Id. The defendants raised the defense that enforcement of the covenants
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment in their amended answer. Brief for
Petitioners at 2, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 87), 1947 WL 30427.
The United States Supreme Court may review final judgments by a state’s highest
court “where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution.” U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000). Federal jurisdiction exists when
the case involves “a direct adjudication against the validity of a right or privilege
claimed under a law of the United States.” Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 9 (1894).
Therefore, litigants intending to appeal a state’s supreme court decision should
allege a Fourteenth Amendment claim at the outset of the litigation. At least, the
private owner should make such an allegation at the time the first state court
expands the public trust doctrine, effectuating a loss of a property right.
317
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 18.
318
Id.
319
Id. at 14 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883)).
320
See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 148 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (“‘The
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of
personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.’” (quoting Wilkeson v.
Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657 (1829))).
316
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321

beaches, to quasi-municipal beaches, and quite possibly to privately322
The New Jersey courts
owned beaches in special circumstances.
323
have distorted the traditional protections of the doctrine. The New
Jersey Supreme Court in Matthews should have arrived at the same
result without expanding the doctrine beyond recognition. Instead,
like in Van Ness, the court could have based its decision to grant the
public access to the Association’s beach on the fact that it had already
324
been dedicated to public recreation.
Before Matthews, private
landowners knew their rights and appreciated that they ended at the
high water mark. Today, private landowners do not have that same
level of understanding. The courts did not consider factors like
“stability of title in land, the essential qualities of private ownership
including the right to exclude others, constraints upon retrospective
alterations of the definitions of land title, and any limits upon the
public interest in communal use of property that may be found in the
325
prohibitions of takings.” New Jersey today has one of the most
326
expansive public trust doctrines.
However, the doctrine has drifted too far from its original
purposes. The courts have thus taken a doctrine with “a seemingly
respected place in the historical jurisprudence of Britain and the
United States” and “employed [it] to assertively readjust notions of
327
the private and public interests in property.”
While the original
doctrine protected both the public and the private landowners,
contemporary courts use the doctrine as a way to redistribute
328
Proponents of such judicial activism acknowledge the
property.
redistributive element in this policy but claim that the “bonuses” to
329
the public outweigh the “sacrifices” of the landowners.
Whether
this is true depends upon one’s particular values. Therefore,
allowing the courts to make this determination involves a policy
330
The courts
determination that is properly left to the legislatures.
321

See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47
(N.J. 1972).
322
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
323
The public trust doctrine’s main purpose is to protect the wet sand area
(seaward of the mean high tide line) because of its importance to all. See Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
324
See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573–74 (N.J. 1978).
325
Scott, supra note 111, at 44.
326
Morris, supra note 5, at 1020–21.
327
Scott, supra note 111, at 4.
328
Kehoe, supra note 81, at 1937.
329
Id.
330
See W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV.
1487, 1491 (2004) (“In general, legislatures are presumed to act prospectively, saying
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should not drastically change property law by implanting their own
331
Rather, if changes are necessary, the political
ideas of policy.
branches should institute such changes because legislative decisions
332
are firmly subject to the built-in restraint of the takings doctrine.
The courts’ role is to interpret law and apply it to the current case
333
not to change centuries of law because of public
before it,
334
pressure.
Any property redistribution should be accomplished
335
through the states’ power of eminent domain.
Since it is doubtful that the judiciary will subject its own
336
determinations to the protections of the Takings Clause, the courts
should not redistribute private property to the public without
providing some sort of relief to the affected owner. In other words,
courts should not utilize the public trust doctrine to bypass
constitutional rights and requirements. The courts should clearly
define the geographic scope of the doctrine as well as the rights
associated with it, and any changes to the definition should only
apply prospectively. A narrow interpretation of the doctrine would
eradicate any confusion over notice and provide the private owner
with greater protections. Another option that would be fair to private
owners is a tax deduction for those owners who involuntarily or
voluntarily open their property to the public. This provides some
relief to owners who must maintain the property and may be subject
to new liabilities.
Limiting the expansion of the public trust doctrine would
337
protect investment expectations and, in turn, provide for stable and
predictable real estate investments. More importantly, state courts
should be more conservative in their application of the public trust
doctrine when expansion would directly affect the rights and
privileges of the private owner, specifically where the proposed
what the law shall be, while courts are presumed to decide questions retrospectively,
saying what the law is and has been.”).
331
See Thompson, supra note 25, at 1544.
332
See Welby, supra note 59, at 91.
333
See Sarratt, supra note 330, at 1534 (discussing the effects judicial activism has
on the balance of power between the branches of government).
334
See Scott, supra note 111, at 44 (“In sum, it might be observed that New Jersey
has generally taken a politically active and acquisitive approach to the public trust
doctrine, and the courts have responded in support.”).
335
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
336
See generally id. (discussing the controversy of exempting judicial
determinations from the takings protections).
337
See Kehoe, supra note 81, at 1914 (“Public access to all oceanfront property
irrespective of the landowners’ rights would cause an extreme diminution in
property values of privately owned oceanfront land.”).
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change would be unconstitutional if implemented by the legislature
or executive agencies. Lastly, a limited interpretation of the public
trust doctrine will maintain clear and distinct boundary lines among
the branches of government, thus eradicating any accountability
issues associated with such decisions.

